property | value |
tags | apt,apt-unc4841,intel-report,mandiant,pkm-pocket-pipeline,threat-intel |
url | |
original_word_count | 4455 |
Article Excerpt
a blog post detailing an 8-month-long global espionage campaign conducted by a Chinese-nexus threat group tracked as UNC4841.
Long Summary
Mandiant has identified a global espionage campaign conducted by a Chinese-nexus threat group tracked as UNC4841. The campaign spanned the timeframe between October 2022 and June 2023, and utilized a wide range of malware and purpose-built tooling to enable their operations. The primary targets included national governments, high tech and information technology entities, local governments, telecommunications providers, manufacturing entities, and colleges and universities.
The campaign utilized a variety of techniques, including the deployment of initial payloads, targeted commands, and later stage tools. It was also observed using port 8080 and 443 for C2 communications, as well as deploying custom malware based on modified REPTILE source code. Additionally, the campaign was observed to be highly responsive to defensive efforts and actively modified TTPs to maintain access within victim environments.
Mandiant identified three code families being selectively deployed by UNC4841: SKIPJACK, DEPTHCHARGE, and FOXTROT / FOXGLOVE. SKIPJACK is a passive backdoor implemented by trojanizing legitimate Barracuda ESG modules by injecting malicious Lua code. DEPTHCHARGE is packaged as a Linux shared object library, which is pre-loaded into the Barracuda SMTP (BSMTP) daemon using LD_PRELOAD. FOXTROT / FOXGLOVE is a modular backdoor that is capable of executing arbitrary commands, downloading and uploading files, and establishing a reverse shell.
Mandiant has identified overlaps in infrastructure used by UNC4841 with that which has been associated with UNC2286, another China-nexus actor. Additionally, Mandiant has observed another sophisticated espionage focused China-nexus actor, UNC3886, deploying custom malware based on modified REPTILE source code. These observations are evidence of the higher level trends observed in Chinese cyber espionage and the evolution toward more purposeful, stealthy, and effective operations that avoid detection and complicate attribution.
Mandiant recommends impacted Barracuda customers continue to hunt for UNC4841 activity within networks impacted by a compromised ESG. Additionally, Mandiant has provided a list of Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) to aid in the hunting of UNC4841 activity. If you were impacted by this campaign, Mandiant recommends you contact the FBI at [email protected]. Mandiant Security Validation is a set of actions that organizations can use to validate their security controls.
In conclusion, this
Short Summary
š Mandiant Gives Back
šš½ a blog post detailing an 8-month-long global espionage campaign conducted by a Chinese-nexus threat group tracked as UNC4841. text highlights the following main purposes:
šš½ Mandiant identifies a global espionage campaign conducted by a Chinese-nexus threat group. šš½ The campaign operated between October 2022 and June 2023. šš½ The threat group utilized various malware and purpose-built tools to conduct their operations. šš½ The primary targets of the campaign included national governments, high tech and information technology entities, local governments, telecommunications providers, manufacturing entities, and colleges/universities. šš½ The campaign employed different techniques, including the deployment of initial payloads and targeted commands. šš½ Port 8080 and 443 were used for C2 communications, along with customized malware based on modified REPTILE source code. šš½ The threat group actively modified tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to maintain access within victim environments. šš½ Mandiant identified three code families used selectively by the threat group: SKIPJACK, DEPTHCHARGE, and FOXTROT/FOXGLOVE. šš½ Overlaps in infrastructure were found between UNC4841 and UNC2286, indicating a connection. šš½ Mandiant recommends affected Barracuda customers to continue hunting for UNC4841 activity and provides indicators of compromise (IOCs) for assistance.
š source link: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc4841-post-barracuda-zero-day-remediation
š summarized content: https://hut.threathunterz.com/battlefield-intel/articles-and-reports/mandiant-gives-back
#ChineseEspionage #UNC4841Campaign #CustomMalware #CyberEspionage #MandiantSecurityValidation